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Abstract
In 1991, after a long period of politicized lending to state-owned businesses known as
parastatals, Tanzania set out to reform its financial system by legalizing private financial
institutions and cleaning up state-owned banks. As part of this effort, Tanzania established
the Loans and Advances Realization Trust (LART) to acquire nonperforming assets from
state-owned banks in exchange for government bonds. Following these transfers, the
Tanzanian government then recapitalized the transferring institutions. LART’s mandate was
to recover outstanding amounts on nonperforming assets and to help debtors restructure to
facilitate repayment. To enhance LART’s ability to make recoveries, Tanzanian authorities
established a special LART Loan Recovery Tribunal with simplified procedures and exclusive
jurisdiction over transferred assets. Tanzanian authorities initially established LART with a
five-year timeframe, subject to a one-year extension. In 1996, Tanzania amended the
legislation establishing LART to include private financial institutions and extend its
operations to June 30, 2000, with the possibility of two one-year extensions. During its
lifetime, LART acquired approximately TSh 85 billion ($96 million) in nonperforming
assets—TSh 27 billion initially after its establishment and a further TSh 58 billion in 1996.
By the time LART concluded its operations in January 2001, it had recovered approximately
TSh 33 billion.
Keywords: Tanzania, asset management companies, asset purchase programs, LART
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Tanzanian Loans and Advances
Realization Trust (LART)
At a Glance
In 1967, the recently formed nation of
Tanzania nationalized its banking system
pursuant to a declaration issued by its
socialist government (Nord et al. 2009).
Government ownership of both financial
institutions
and
state-controlled
businesses known as parastatals resulted
in bank lending based on political
considerations
rather
than
creditworthiness (Chijoriga 2000; Nord et
al. 2009). With a shift toward liberalization
beginning in the mid-1980s, parastatals
faced increased competition and the loss of
government subsidies. This change
resulted in mounting losses at the stateowned banks that the government had
directed to lend to the parastatals (Nord et
al. 2009). According to a report on
Tanzania’s banking system released in
1990, nonperforming loans comprised up
to 45% of the total loan portfolio at the
primary state-owned commercial bank, the
National Bank of Commerce (Chijoriga
2000). A 1991 estimate put that figure as
high as 70% (Johnson et al. 1999).

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To hold the nonperforming assets of banks
and to “take such action as may be necessary to
recover all amounts outstanding in respect of such . . .
assets, and to advise, direct or facilitate the measures
that have to be taken by or in respect of the debtors
so as to enhance their capacity to repay” (LART Act
1991).
Launch Dates
Announcement: 1991
First transfer: 1992
Wind-Down
Dates

Initially, December 31, 1995; later
extended to January 31, 2001

Size and Type
of
Nonperforming
Loan Problem

45% to 70% of the total loan
portfolio at the primary stateowned commercial bank

Program Size

Not specified at outset

Eligible
Institutions

State-owned financial institutions
initially; later expanded to include
private financial institutions

Commercial loans
controlled businesses

to

state-

Open-bank only
Usage

TSh
85
billion
(approx.
$96 million) transferred (approx.
5% of GDP) (Nord et al. 2009)

Against this backdrop, Tanzania in 1991 set
out to reform its financial system by
Approx. TSh 33 billion recovered
legalizing private financial institutions and Outcomes
(Johnson et al. 1999)
cleaning up state-owned banks (Nord et al.
Government-owned
2009). To accomplish this goal, Tanzanian Ownership
Structure
authorities sought and received technical
Special tribunal with exclusive
and financial assistance from the World Notable
Features
jurisdiction over transferred
Bank, the African Development Fund, and
assets to facilitate recoveries
other international donors (ADF 2000). In
pursuit of its goal of cleaning up state-owned banks, Tanzania established the Loans and
Advances Realization Trust (LART) in 1991 as an autonomous government-owned
institution (Johnson et al. 1999; LART Act 1991). Under its authorizing legislation, LART
directed financial institutions to transfer their nonperforming assets to LART at a price it
determined (LART Act 1991). Institutions received government bonds in exchange for the
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transferred assets. Following these transfers, the Tanzanian government then recapitalized
the transferring institutions (ADF 2000).
LART’s mandate was to recover outstanding amounts on nonperforming assets and to help
debtors restructure to facilitate repayment (LART Act 1991). To enhance LART’s ability to
make recoveries, Tanzanian authorities established a special LART Loan Recovery Tribunal
with simplified procedures and exclusive jurisdiction over transferred assets (LART Act
1991; Nord et al. 2009).
The legislation establishing LART created a board of trustees that was responsible for
governing it. The president of Tanzania appointed the chairman of this board, who was
joined by four to six other members appointed by the minister of finance. An “administrator”
appointed by the minister of finance had authority over the day-to-day operations of LART,
subject to oversight from the board (LART Act 1991).
Tanzanian authorities initially established LART with a five-year timeframe, subject to a oneyear extension. In 1996, Tanzania amended the legislation establishing LART to include
private financial institutions and extend its operations to June 30, 2000, with the possibility
of two one-year extensions (LART Act 1996).
During its lifetime, LART acquired approximately TSh 85 billion ($96 million)3 in
nonperforming assets—TSh 27 billion initially after its establishment and a further
TSh 58 billion in 1996 (Johnson et al. 1999). The National Bank of Commerce accounted for
around 70% of these assets, with the remaining assets coming from other state-owned
financial institutions including the Tanzania Investment Bank, the Tanzania Housing Bank,
and the Cooperative and Rural Development Bank (Chijoriga 2000). By the time LART
concluded its operations in January 2001, it had recovered approximately TSh 33 billion
(Johnson et al. 1999; World Bank 2001).
Summary Evaluation
While there has been little evaluation of LART, a report by the World Bank (2001) concluded
that “LART’s strong management, professional staff, operational autonomy, and the ability
to move collection cases rapidly through a dedicated court, which was funded by the
Government, enabled LART to effectively and satisfactorily carry out its mandate.” Tripp
(1997) argues that bureaucratic infighting between LART and the Parastatal Sector Reform
Commission, a separate government body established by Tanzanian authorities to promote
the divestiture of state-owned businesses, hampered privatization efforts.

3

Exchange rate of approximately 888 TSh to $1 provided by World Bank 2001.
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Tanzanian Loans and Advances Realization Trust: Tanzania Context
GDP
$4.26 billion in 1990
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to
$4.96 billion in 1991
USD)
GDP per capita
$174 in 1990
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to
$196 in 1991
USD)
Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior
debt)
Data not available for 1990–91
Size of banking system

$0.91 billion in 1990
$1.07 billion in 1991

Size of banking system as a percentage of
GDP
Size of banking system as a percentage of
financial system
5-bank concentration of banking system
Foreign involvement in banking system
Government ownership of banking system
Existence of deposit insurance
Sources: Bloomberg; IMF 1996.
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21.4% in 1990
21.6% in 1991
Data not available for 1990–91
Data not available for 1990–91
No foreign involvement as of 1989
100% government-owned as of 1989
No in 1990–91
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Key Design Decisions
1.

Part of a Package: Tanzanian authorities established LART as the first step in a
two-step process that also involved recapitalizing the financial institutions from
which LART acquired nonperforming assets.

Institutions transferred nonperforming assets to LART when and as directed by LART (LART
Act 1991). Following these transfers, the Tanzanian government then recapitalized the
transferring institutions (ADF 2000). It does not appear that LART itself was responsible for
the recapitalizations.
2.

Legal Authority: The Tanzanian Parliament adopted the Loans and Advances
Realization Trust Act (the LART Act) in 1991 in order to establish LART and
amended the LART Act in 1996 to expand LART’s mandate.

Parliament amended the LART Act in 1996 to include private financial institutions and
extend LART’s timeframe until at least 2000 (LART Act 1996).
3.

Special Powers: The LART Act also established the LART Loan Recovery Tribunal
with simplified procedures and exclusive jurisdiction over transferred assets in
order to accelerate recovery.

At the time of LART’s establishment, legal proceedings involving nonperforming assets took
anywhere from one to five years (World Bank 2001). To accelerate the pace of recovery, the
LART Act created a special LART Loan Recovery Tribunal with simplified procedures and
exclusive jurisdiction over transferred assets (LART Act 1991). This reduced hearing times
to an average of three months (World Bank 2001).
4.

Mandates: LART’s mandates were to minimize losses and manage nonperforming
assets by pursuing delinquent debtors and actively restructuring debtors if
necessary to enhance their capacity to repay.

The LART Act established LART to hold the nonperforming assets of banks and to “take such
action as may be necessary to recover all amounts outstanding in respect of such . . . assets,
and to advise, direct or facilitate the measures that have to be taken by or in respect of the
debtors so as to enhance their capacity to repay” (LART Act 1991).
5.

Ownership Structure: LART was government-owned.

The LART Act established LART as an autonomous government-owned institution (Johnson
et al. 1999; LART Act 1991).
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Governance/Administration: LART was governed by a board of trustees
appointed by the president and minister of finance.

The LART Act created a board of trustees that was responsible for governing LART. The
president of Tanzania appointed the chairman of this board, who was joined by four to six
other members appointed by the minister of finance. An “administrator” appointed by the
minister of finance had authority over the day-to-day operations of LART, subject to
oversight from the board (LART Act 1991). LART maintained a professional staff of
approximately 20 people (World Bank 1999).
7.

Size: Tanzanian authorities do not appear to have established a specific cap on
LART’s size.

The LART Act contained no references to a cap on the amount of nonperforming assets that
could be acquired by LART (LART Act 1991).
8.

Funding Source: The Tanzanian government funded LART.

The Tanzanian government incurred significant costs from LART’s operations and the
related recapitalization of transferring financial institutions. It was anticipated that these
costs would be outweighed in the long run by benefits in the form of “the savings on the
subsidies that would have otherwise been provided to loss-making banks, and the
incremental fiscal revenues from the earnings of profitable financial institutions and higher
economic growth” (ADF 2000).
9.

Eligible Institutions: Initially, LART purchased assets from state-owned
institutions being recapitalized, with private financial institutions ultimately
being made eligible in 1996.

The 1996 amendment to the LART Act expanded eligibility to private financial institutions,
which had been made legal again as part of the financial system reforms launched in 1991
(LART Act 1996; Nord et al. 2009). It does not appear that any private financial institutions
participated.
10. Eligible Assets: Initially, only nonperforming assets held by state-owned financial
institutions at the time LART was established were eligible for participation.
The LART Act provided that the nonperforming assets eligible for transfer were those (a) in
existence as of the commencement of the LART Act or (b) in existence as of December 30,
1990 (subject to extension to December 31, 1991), provided that they were on the books of
the institution as of June 30, 1988 (LART Act 1991). The 1996 amendment to the LART Act
expanded eligibility to all assets determined to be nonperforming consistent with regulatory
guidance (LART Act 1996). The nonperforming assets transferred to LART consisted largely
of commercial loans to state-controlled businesses.
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11. Acquisition – Mechanics: Eligible financial institutions transferred
nonperforming assets when directed to do so by LART and received government
bonds as consideration.
Under the LART Act, LART provided written direction to financial institutions requiring them
to transfer nonperforming assets (LART Act 1991). Financial institutions that transferred
nonperforming assets at the direction of LART received government bonds as consideration.
These bonds carried interest rates of 11% and had maturities of 20 years or more (ADF
2000).
12. Acquisition – Pricing: LART determined the price to be paid for transferred
assets, but it is unclear how it did so or what its determinations were.
The LART Act provided that LART would pay for transferred assets “such sums as may be
determined by [LART] at such rate, in such form and subject to such other terms and
conditions as [LART] may determine” (LART Act 1991). It is not clear from program
documents exactly what price LART determined should be paid or how this price was
determined.
13. Management and Disposal: Initially, LART focused on seizing and selling assets
in order to achieve recoveries.
Initially LART made most of its recoveries on nonperforming assets via seizure and sale of
assets (Johnson et al. 1999). Ultimately, LART employed a broader array of approaches
including “direct recovery of outstanding liabilities, rescheduling of assets, negotiated
settlement, packaging of assets to facilitate disposition, and auctions” (World Bank 2001).
14. Timeframe: Tanzanian authorities initially established LART with a five-year
timeframe ending on December 31, 1995 with the option for a one-year
extension before further extending the program into 2001.
The LART Act provided for a five-year timeframe for the program, with the option for a oneyear extension (LART Act 1991). The 1996 amendment to the LART Act extended this
timeframe until June 30, 2000, with the option for two one-year extensions (LART Act 1996).
The program ultimately concluded in January 2001 (World Bank 2001).
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